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COMMENT
ABSTINENCE BREEDS CONTEMPT: WHY THE U.S. POLICY ON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILY PLANNING IS CAUSE FOR
CONCERN
I. INTRODUCTION

Since taking office, George W. Bush has been forced to act in a series of
unprecedented and highly dramatic developments on the foreign policy
stage. The media focuses most public attention on the issues perceived to affect the lives of American citizens most directly-the aftermath of September 11th and the amorphous potential threat posed by any number of Middle
Eastern hotbeds. However, a tectonic shift in the United States' policy on
foreign assistance for family planning has taken place as well. This shift has
affected millions of people in the world's least developed countries. 1
The early stages of this radical change in policy have gone largely unnoticed and unchallenged. In light of current events and the relevance of our
"rights" as Americans, it is now especially important to recognize that the
sole voice 2 of our nation is communicating a policy to the world that is
seemingly in conflict with American ideals, and, to challenge its legal underpinnings.
What follows is a critique of the United States' policy on foreign assistance for family planning, and the State Department's recent decision to
deny release of appropriated funds to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) for fiscal year 2002. Part II of this Comment traces
the historical development of the United States' policy on foreign assistance
for family planning and the role of the pro-life movement. Part III discusses
the relevant legislation and subsequent case law. Part IV argues that policy
decisions with a pro-life agenda undermine broader strategic goals of the
United States, and the resulting policy leaves the United States vulnerable to
challenges under National and International law. Part V concludes the critique.
1. Statement by Thoraya A. Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund,
on U.S. Funding Decision (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.unfpa.org/about/ed/
2002/usfunddecision.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Obaid Statement].
2. The distribution of federal power is different as applied to international versus domestic issues. The delicate and complex nature of most international problems requires that the
President speak as the "sole organ" of the United States on issues of foreign affairs. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILY PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF THE PRO-LIFE
MOVEMENT
A. HistoricalContext Before 1984
The foreign policy label attached to foreign assistance for family planning when it became an appropriated expenditure pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA).3 In practice, this label empowers the President to speak as the sole voice of the United States on the matter, 4 and encourages exploration of the gray area between moral proselytizing 5 for political gain and the exercise of legitimate Executive authority.
The federal government first addressed the issue of foreign aid for family planning in response to global considerations of population policy and

control, an evolutionary product of a 200 yearlong debate.6 The early commentators, which included mercantilist and utopian theorists, were not troubled by unchecked population growth.7 Greater population equaled greater

wealth and military strength.8 Alternatively, economists, including Thomas
Robert Malthus, felt that unchecked population growth was actually a threat
to prosperity, and that population growth should be held at a sustainable
level in order to prevent widespread poverty.9 Malthus concluded that,
unless the "moral restraints" of marriage at a later age and extramarital abstinence were adopted, the death rate would rise and restrain population
growth. ° However, as an Anglican clergyman, Malthus dismissed notions of
contraception and abortion as "vice. ' ' "
Karl Marx, who favored the mercantilist and utopian approach to population, later criticized the Malthus economic theory. 2 Marx felt that because
population growth was a natural phenomenon and people were both consumers arid producers, the resource limits, which worried economists, could
3. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (1961).
4. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 319.
5. The phrase "moral proselytizing" may be used to refer to the pre-emergence stage in
the development of a customary norm in international law. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT. ORG. 887, 897 (1998).
Finnemore and Sikkink use the term in reference to moral entrepreneurs, individuals having
"strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their communities." Id. The success
of moral proselytizing typically requires the support of an organizational platform. id. at 899.
Central to this critique is reservation as to the appropriateness of the United States government as an organizational platform for certain issues.
6. Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Population Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93, at 63,
70.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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arise under capitalism but not socialism.13 In 1921, Lenin embraced Marx's
views. 4 Three basic population principles ultimately emerged from Marxism-Leninism: population growth as a natural phenomenon; abortion as a
woman's right, unrelated to population; and contraception as "shabby Malthusianism."' 5
In October of 1946, at the behest of the United States and Great Britain,
the United Nations established a Population Commission. 16 In 1950, the
Commission issued a report, which stated that in some countries, a high birth
rate could pose an obstacle to economic advancement.' 7 The report encouraged governments to adopt policies that would curb population growth.' 8
In 1959, the first U.S. report on the issue of population growth was issued by the President's Commission to Study the U.S. Military Assistance
Program.' 9 The report recommended that in order to more effectively address the issue of economic development, the United States should assist
countries in formulating plans to deal with the problems caused by rapid
population growth.2' President Eisenhower passed the report onto the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee without commenting on the recommendation. 1 The Committee agreed with the report. However, the President
blocked the recommendation that the U.S. government provide contraceptive
development assistance to developing countries.2" President Eisenhower felt
that it was inappropriate for the federal government to have a positive political doctrine on birth control.23
U.S. foreign policy on population was first introduced by the Kennedy
administration and the adoption of the FAA.24 In 1963, pursuant to the FAA,
Congress authorized funding for research on population problems and family
planning through population control programs. 2
The Johnson Administration continued to give attention to the relation
between population control and development. President Johnson strongly
supported the creation of a Population Office at the United States Agency for
13. Id.
14. Id. Lenin also legalized abortion in the Soviet Union. This was because abortion was
viewed as a woman's right, rather than an instrument of population or birth control. See id.
15. Id.
16. Ruth Dixon-Mueller, U.S. International Population Policy and the "Woman Question," 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 143, 146 (1987). At the beginning of the Cold War, the
United States and Britain may have pushed for the establishment of the Commission to develop a counter population theory to the only existing Marxist-Leninist one.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 146-47.
19. Id.at 147.
20. Id.at 148.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 149; Teitelbaum, supra note 6,at 67.
25. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 149.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003

3

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 6

348

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

International Development (USAID).26 In 1965, USAID began to support international family planning through grants of foreign assistance, as authorized by the FAA. 7
By the mid to late 1960s, the United States and several western European nations began working together to engage the specialized agencies of
the United Nations in population activities.28 However, this effort was frustrated by an alliance of Catholic and Islamic governments, led by the Soviet
Union and other Marxist-Leninist supporters who felt that population growth
was a natural phenomenon.29 Then, in 1969, the United States spearheaded
an initiative to establish the voluntary UNFPA.3 ° The purpose of the Fund
was to reduce poverty, improve health, and raise living standards around the
32
world. 31 Before long, the United States was the Fund's largest contributor.
President Nixon continued to support international population initiatives. During his administration, USAID funding for contraceptive research
and family planning distribution programs grew exponentially. 33 This funding went towards, among other things, simplified methods of female sterilization and methods of early pregnancy termination that were safe and effective. 34 Nixon also lobbied for the first global conference on population,
3
which was held in Bucharest, under the auspices of the United Nations. 1
The focus of debate at the conference was on the issue of population growth
and its fundamental link to underdevelopment. 36 In order to develop a parallel domestic policy, which reflected the impact of population growth on life
in America, President Nixon appointed the Commission on Population
Growth and the American Future. 37
While the U.S. foreign policy on population quietly subsisted through
the Ford and Carter Administrations, the domestic abortion debate reached a
fever pitch. 38 A 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, legalized
26. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.

27. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 150.
28. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Government Press Release, Senator Feinstein Calls on the Bush Administration to
Reconsider Decision to Divert $34 Million from UN Fund for Population (July 24, 2002)
availableat 2002 WL 7273380 [hereinafter Feinstein Release]; The Bush Global Gag Rule: A
Violation of InternationalHuman Rights and the U.S. Constitution, B019 (July 2001), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub-art-ggr.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Global
Gag Rule].
32. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31; Susan F. Rasky, Reagan Restrictions on Foreign
Aidfor Abortion ProgramsLead to a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1984, at A20.

33. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 153. "Total assistance to population programs grew
from $2.1 million in 1965 to $125.6 million in 1973." Id.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
36. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 154.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 68.
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abortion in the United States. 39 In response, disappointed pro-life groups
sought ways to expand their efforts beyond narrowly defined abortion issues."° These groups turned their attention to programs funded by the government,41which were meant to aid low-income people in controlling their
fertility. Notably, the same year Roe was decided, Congress passed the
Helms Amendment to the FAA, which prohibited U.S. foreign assistance
from being used for abortion services in recipient nations.42
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, who had run a staunchly pro-life
campaign supported by a number of pro-life groups, ushered in a new era of
pro-life activism.43 Encouraged by a supporter of the pro-life movement in
the White House, these groups continued to focus on the domestic limitations of federal funding for abortion and contraceptive services. 44 However,
there was considerable opposition from pro-choice groups. ' Undaunted, the
pro-lifers simply sought a path of less resistance.
It did not take long for the pro-life movement to carve out a niche in the
field of foreign policy shielded by a "general public ambivalence towards
foreign assistance."4 6 When activists were unable to eradicate abortion in the
United States, foiled by those who viewed reproductive freedoms as indicia
of personal autonomy,47 they would simply take a different tack. The prolifers would take their fight to where access to education and marital choice
aspects of personal autonomy 4 were of more primary concerns, and where
local actors were dependent on assistance from the United States to achieve
recognition of these fundamental freedoms.49
In 1984, pro-life advocacy groups achieved two things that walked quietly towards this goal, but carried big sticks. First, with the help of supporters in the White House, James Buckley, a former Republican Senator from
New York, was appointed chairman of the United States' delegation to the
second United Nations International Conference on Population, in Mexico
City.5 ° As a senator, Buckley tried, unsuccessfully, to eliminate all U.S.

39. Id. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the Constitutional right
to privacy is applicable to a woman's decision of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy).
40. Teitelbaum, supra note 6,at 68. Pro-life efforts had focused primarily on the passage
of a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1) (2002));
Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 153.
43. Teitelbaum, supra note 6,at 68.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Sylvia A. Law & Lisa F. Rackner, Gender Equality and the Mexico City Policy,
20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 209 (1987).
48. See id. at 213.
49. See Sharon Camp, The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Women and Health Care
in Developing Countries, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 46-51 (1987).
50. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 69.
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funds for population assistance. 5 Second, the pro-life advocacy groups
suc52
cessfully called for a review of U.S. foreign policy on population.
Around the same time, on the other side of the globe, the new Chinese
leadership was rejecting the Marxist-Leninist population ideals, which had
been embraced by Maoist leaders. 53 In China, it seemed as though the future
of socialism now depended on limiting fertility. 54 Political officials at all
levels heralded the Malthusian economic theory, as well as the abortion and
contraception he opposed.55
Ironically, as this was taking place in China, conservative political advisors in America were moving closer towards the Marxist theory. 56 They began to argue that "rapid population growth was, at worst, a neutral factor in
economic development-and indeed might be a positive force so long as the
'correct' economic systems were in place."57 These arguments were promoted in background papers that were then presented to the Reagan White
58
House.
B. HistoricalContext 1984-2000
In 1984, in his address to the UN Conference in Mexico City, Buckley
announced President Reagan's newly revised population policy.5 9 The
"Mexico City Policy" pronounced that rapid population growth was a neutral
phenomenon, and any alleged population problem actually resulted from too
much government control and "an outbreak of intellectualism which attacked
science, technology and the very concept of material progress."6 The Mexico City Policy imposed additional restrictions on foreign assistance made
pursuant to the FAA. Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGO's),
to which USAID provided population assistance, were prohibited from using
not only USAID funds to provide or promote abortion as a method of family
planning, but non-USAID funds as well. 6'
In order to implement this policy, a Standard Clause, outlining the restrictions, was inserted into all contracts and cooperative agreements for aid
disbursed pursuant to the FAA.62 In order to remain eligible for USAID
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id.
55. ld.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Policy Statement of the United States of America at the United Nations International
Conference on Population, 2d Sess., Mexico City (Aug. 6-13, 1984) [hereinafter Mexico City
Statement]; Rasky, supra note 32.
60. Rasky, supra note 32; Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 69.
61. Camp, supra note 49, at 35.
62. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2002).
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funding the Standard Clause required FNGO's to certify in writing that they
would "not, while receiving assistance under the grant, perform or actively
promote abortion as a method of family planning in [US]AID-recipient
countries or provide financial support to other foreign nongovernmental organizations that conduct such activities. "63
Population assistance funding was further restricted by the KempKasten Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1985,
which codified a new strain of Executive discretion. 64 Under Kemp-Kasten,
none of the funds made available pursuant to the Appropriations Act could
be "made available to any organization or program which, as determined by
the President of the United States, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. 65
As a result of the Executive discretion afforded by Kemp-Kasten, the
$10 million earmarked for UNFPA that year, 1985, was withheld, although
not because UNFPA was an "organization which includes as part of its
population planning programs involuntary abortion. "66 Even though
"UNFPA neither fund[ed] abortions nor support[ed] coercive family planning practices through its programs," the funds were withheld because of the
UNFPA presence in China. 67
The People's Republic of China had adopted a one-child-per-family policy, as a means of controlling rapid population growth.68 There were suspicions by "[s]ome U.S. policyrnakers" that this policy was enforced, in part,
through coerced abortions and involuntary sterilizations.6 9 The UNFPA
funds for fiscal year 1985 were denied on the grounds that the practices of
the family planning programs in China were "such that any support for that
country's programs is linked with and gives the appearance of condoning its
practices."7 After spearheading its creation in 1969, the U.S. denied funding
to the UNFPA in 1985 based on a subjective interpretation of the KempKasten language rather than any evidentiary proof of wrongdoing.
The Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause restrictions remained
in place during the first Bush Administration, and the U.S. continued to
forego funding of the UNFPA. The Mexico City Policy and the Standard
Clause were both repealed by President Clinton in 1993, but Kemp-Kasten
remained a part of the yearly Appropriations Acts.7 1

63. Id.
64. Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat.
293 (1985) [hereinafter Appropriations Act].
65. Id. See Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
66. PopulationInst., 797 F.2d at 1065.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy v. George W. Bush, No. 01 CIV. 4986(LAP),
2001 WL 868007, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2001).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 6

352

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

During the Clinton Administration, in 1994, there was an International
72
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt.
The ICPD was lauded as a "watershed event," because "it moved away from
traditional ideas of family planning and embraced the idea that giving
women more control over their lives would provide a check against explosive population growth."73 The United States delegation to the Conference
was instrumental in drafting the ICPD Programme of Action, which set out
three principal goals: to provide universal access to health and primary education; to reduce maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS; and to advance gender
equality.74 The work
of UNFPA would be crucial to meeting these goals
75
around the world.
C. HistoricalContext 2000-2002
1. George W. Bush
Shortly after taking office, President Bush announced that he would reinstate the "Mexico City Policy."76 Although Congress had already appropriated $34 million to the UNFPA for fiscal year 2002, Bush delayed the release of the funds after he took office.7 7 The delay was due to new
allegations, made by a small group of pro-life extremists, regarding UNFPA
involvement in China.78 The Administration sent a fact finding team to investigate the allegations and to determine whether it was appropriate to re79
lease the funds.
In July of 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the decision
to deny the release of $34 million that was appropriated for UNFPA family
planning programs.8" Based on an interpretation of Kemp-Kasten, as part of

72. James Dao, U.S. May Abandon Support of U.N. Population Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov.
2,
2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com2002/11/02/intemational/asia/
02ABOR.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).

73. Id.
74. Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director of UNFPA, Statement at the 2002 International Parliamentarian's Conference on the Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action, Ottawa, Canada (Nov. 21-22, 2002), available at http://www.unfpa.org/about/
ed/2002/ottawa.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ICPD Statement].
75. Id.
76. Memorandum For the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development: Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,303 (Mar. 28, 2001).
77. Michelle Goldberg, A $34 million "political payoff' (July 23, 2002), available at

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/07/23/unfpa/print.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
78. id. The allegations were made by an organization called the Population Research Institute. Id.
79. Id.
80. Letter from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (July 23, 2002), available at
http://www.unfpa.org/news/2002related-documents/usfundingreport0l.pdf (last visited Nov.
15, 2002).
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the Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, the funds were denied because
UNFPA allegedly played a prohibited role in what has been interpreted as
China's practice of coercive abortion. 8 This decision was made, even
though UNFPA: certified that they in no way support coercive abortion; investigated allegations of coercive abortion and withdrew funding where appropriate; and separated U.S. donations in different accounts, which certified
that none of the money went to China.8 2 The State Department promised instead to put the money towards the USAID Child Survival and Health Program Fund. 3 This decision was inconsistent with the findings set out in the
fact finding team's report.84 Also, USAID serves significantly fewer countries than UNFPA, 5 and the permissible scope of the Agency's work is limited. 6
The evolution of United States involvement in international family
planning programs, rooted in global population concerns, has yielded a political forum for abortion policy making, unfettered by the constitutional restrictions imposed on the domestic abortion debate.87 While the President
has broad discretion to set policy in Foreign Affairs matters, this decision
undermines broader policies of the United States regarding population, family planning and development.88
III. RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
A. Legislative Context
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) was the first statutory authority to support international economic development with U.S. funds. The
89
FAA declares Congressional policy on foreign development assistance.
Under the FAA:
[the] principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the
encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to

81. Id.; Richard Boucher, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing
(July 22, 2002), transcript available at http://www.state.gov./r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/12036pf.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter July 22 Press Briefing].
82. Obaid Statement, supra note 1.
83. July 22 Press Briefing, supranote 81.
84. Obaid Statement, supra note 1.
85. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81. USAID is involved in family planning programs in 60 countries. Id. UNFPA provides family planning services in 142 countries. Obaid
Statement, supra note 1.
86. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81.
87. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31. See also James Dao, U.S. Raises Abortion Issue at
Conference on Families, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2002, at A4.
88. Dao, supra note 72.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2002).
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and social institutions
development and to build the economic, political
90

which will improve the quality of their lives.

In 1973, Congress adopted the Helms Amendment to the FAA, which

states that "[n]one of the funds made available to carry out this subchapter
may be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in
part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning."9 1 This restriction was applicable only to
U.S. government funds. 92 Under the Helms Amendment, FNGO's receiving
U.S. assistance were still able to promote abortion with non-U.S. funds. 93
After the addition of Kemp-Kasten in 1985, the President delegated the
authority to administer the voluntary population planning policy to the Secretary of State, who then delegated it to the Director of the United States International Development and Cooperation Agency. 94 This authority was then
delegated to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development 95 because funding for the UNFPA was appropriated as part of a USAID
managed account.9 6
Currently, any funding for UNFPA comes out of the State Department's
International Organizations and Programs Account. 97 Because of the source
of UNFPA funds, the President delegated the authority to implement KempKasten to the Secretary of State in 1995.98 So, as it currently stands, the Secretary has the authority to make the Kemp-Kasten determination, as to
whether a particular program or organization supports or participates in a
program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.
In light of these delegations of authority, under Kemp-Kasten, it is not
just the President who gets to "furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for voluntary population planning." 99 Rather, a
political appointee, the Secretary of State, gets to determine the terms and
conditions under which foreign assistance is given for voluntary population
planning, while another appointee, the USAID Administrator, ensures that

90. Id.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3) (2002). See DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887
F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
92. Ctr.for Reproductive Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 187.
93. Id.
94. Exec. Order No. 12,163, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,673 (Sept. 29, 1979). See Planned Parenthood v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).
95. IDCA Delegation No. 1, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,521 (1979) reprinted as amended in 45
Fed. Reg. 74,090 (Nov. 7, 1980). See Planned Parenthood,915 F.2d at 61.
96. See Analysis of Determination that Kemp-Kasten Amendment Precludes Further
Funding to UNFPA, Pub. L. No. 107-115, available at http://www.unfpa.org/news/2002/relateddocuments/usfundingreport.02.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Analysis of
Determination].
97. Id.
98. id.
99. 22 U.S.C. § 215lb(b) (2002).
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the President's population00policy is implemented by aid recipients once the
determinations are made.'
B. Case Law
The text of the U.S. Constitution makes scant reference to definitive
Foreign Affairs powers. Article II bestows upon the Executive, as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,"' 0. the authority
to "make treaties." ' 2 Article I gives Congress the power to declare war and
spend money.' 0 3 When the Executive and Legislative branches seek to restrain the other with their respective swords of vague Constitutional authority, the Judicial branch is called upon for its soothsayings.104
However, the judiciary will only rarely involve itself in matters that may
be deemed foreign affairs.' 0 5 Thus, a brave instigator of such a challenge
must successfully navigate an obstacle course of nearly insurmountable justiciability doctrines before the federal courts will even consider the merits of
the case. 0 6 The limited case law challenging the constitutionality of different
aspects of the restrictions placed on foreign assistance for family planning
has, for the most part, fallen prey to these doctrines of judicial restraint.
1. Alan Guttmacher Institute v. McPherson
The Alan Guttmacher Institute, and other professionals in the field of international population control and family planning, brought an action against
M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of USAID when the Agency declined to fund publication of the Institute's journal, International Family
Planning Perspectives(Perspectives).10 7 Perspectives addressed issues of international population control and family planning. 08 Funding was denied
because, inter alia, the journal contained two articles that USAID personnel
perceived as advocating abortion.'0 9 In the past, the Institute received funding for Perspectives from USAID, pursuant to the FAA." 0

100. See Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
102. Id. § 2.
103. Id. art. I,§8.
104. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
105. See PopulationInst., 797 F.2d at 1070.
106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (distinguishes between issues of justiciability versus jurisdiction).
107. Alan Guttmacher Inst. v. McPherson, 805 F.2d 1088, 1089 (2d Cir. 1986).
108. Id.
109. Id
I10. Id.
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In 1982, when the Institute applied for funding for 1983, its application
was denied.'11 In its Complaint, the Institute set forth five causes of action:
first, that the funding was denied because of pro-abortion views expressed
other than in the journal, and thus violated the First Amendment; second,
that the denial of funding violated the First and Fifth Amendments because
USAID's decision was "motivated by the accurate reporting of information
in Perspectives;" third, that the denial violated the FAA because the FAA
"affirmatively permitted funding the publication of articles that contained
information about the use and incidence of abortion and that were neutral;"
fourth, that the denial of funding violated "the Due Process Clause because
the decision not to renew funding was not preceded by a hearing;" and fifth,
that the denial was an ' "arbitrary
agency action in violation of the Adminis12
trative Procedure Act." "
The court dismissed the third cause of action on the ground that nothing
in the FAA prevented USAID from deciding not to fund the "publication of
neutral information about abortion." 113 The fourth cause of action was dismissed because the Institute lacked a property interest in the funds." 4 The
fifth cause of action was dismissed because USAID's funding decision was
committed, by law, to agency discretion, and not subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act." 5 The first and second causes of
action were substantially resolved after USAID offered, early on, to reconsider the Institute's grant application without considering activities of the Institute beyond publication of Perspectives, or the two articles that had been
initially construed by the Agency to advocate for abortion." 6 Since the harm
alleged in the first two causes of action had been redressed by a reconsideration of the Institute's grant application, the remaining litigation dealt with
the Institute's efforts to prevent a dismissal of the constitutional challenges
on mootness grounds." 7
The Institute was ultimately successful on this point."' Although the Institute brought the suit just after the announcement of the Mexico City Policy and the imposition of the Standard Clause provisions, the alleged harm
occurred in 1982.' Therefore, this lawsuit may have been brought in order
to gauge the new policy's resistance to statutory versus constitutional challenges.
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2. Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Agency for International
Development
The first case to directly challenge the exercise of Presidential discretion, on the issue of voluntary population policy, was Planned Parenthood
Federation of America v. Agency for International Development. 12 Planned
Parenthood sued USAID and the Agency administrator, M. Peter McPherson, alleging that the Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause were
without statutory authority.12 ' Planned Parenthood claimed that the Mexico
City Policy was not a decision about foreign affairs, but was instead a response by the Reagan Administration to domestic political pressure, and was
adopted to serve domestic political interests rather than a legitimate foreign
policy purpose. 122 Allegedly, the "reason for the promulgation of the policy
and the Standard Clause was to advance the Reagan Admiistration's effort
to suppress pro-choice views and activities in the United States ...and not
for any purported concern with foreign policy or other legitimate governmental purpose. "123 Plaintiffs also alleged that the Mexico City Policy and
the Standard Clause violated their constitutional rights to speech, association
and privacy. 2 4 The government defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, claiming that the challenges
were non-justiciable political questions. 125 The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that
the Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause were within the statutory
and administrative authority of defendants, and
that the constitutional claims
26
presented non-justiciable political questions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the statutory and administrative authority of the defendant, and affirmed the finding that a challenge to the Mexico
City Policy itself was a non-justiciable political question. 27 The court reversed the finding of a non-justiciable political question with regards to the
First Amendment challenges to 28
the Standard Clause as a means of implementing the Mexico City Policy.
On remand, Planned Parenthood argued that a dismissal for failure to
state a claim was inappropriate, because their challenge to the motives behind the government's implementation of the Mexico City Policy, through
insertion of the Standard Clause into grant agreements, required discovery

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

No. Civ. 0248 (JMW), 1990 WL 26306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1990).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7 (citing compl. 30).
Id. (citing compl. 97).
Id. at *2.
Id.
PlannedParenthood,915 F.2d at 61.
Id.
Id.
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and a trial.'2 9 However, the district court held that Plaintiffs challenges to
the motives behind the Mexico City Policy were non-justiciable, in that they
went to the policy itself, and not its implementation.' 3 Because the Policy
was non-justiciable, so too were the challenges. The District Court held that
Planned Parenthood failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because the Standard Clause was the least restrictive means of implementing an unreviewable policy. 3' The District Court granted the33gov32
ernment's motion on those grounds.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed.1

3. DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for International Development
In the midst of the Planned Parenthood litigation, DKT Memorial Fund
v. Agency for International Development' 3 4 set forth another challenge to the
FAA funding restrictions. DKT Memorial Fund, a domestic nongovernmental organization (DNGO), and two FNGO's, Parivar Seva Sanstha (PSS)'35
and Population Services Family Planning Programmes Ltd. (PSFP),'36 had
137
contracted jointly for the purpose of carrying out family planning projects.
One of these projects sought to join educators and mobile medical teams that
would then be sent to rural areas in India to provide comprehensive family
planning services.' 3 8 The project was meant to complement the efforts of the
Indian government, with regards to rural family planning services, and
would last for four years. 3 9 The teams would not provide abortion services
or involuntary sterilizations. 4 None of the plaintiffs had ever applied for,
nor been denied, receipt of a USAID family planning grant.' 4 '
In 1983, in an effort to secure funding to carry out the joint contracts
with DKT and PSFP, PSS applied to the Indian government for a subgrant
under India's Private Voluntary Organizations for Health Project (Project). 42 The PSS subgrant application was not an application to USAID.'4 3
129. PlannedParenthood,1990 WL 26306, at *7.

130.
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134.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Planned Parenthood.,915 F.2d at 59.
630 F. Supp. 238 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1986).

135. Id. PSS, a registered nonprofit society in India, operates family planning clinics

which provide "a comprehensive range of family planning services, including abortion." Id.
136. PSFP, "a nonprofit charity registered in the United Kingdom and a member of the
International Council of Voluntary Agencies... provides technical assistance in the operation
of comprehensive family planning clinics around the world . . . and engages in certain activities relating to voluntary abortion." Id. at 240.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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USAID's involvement in the Project was based on a 1981 grant agreement,
in which the United States provided funding for the Project.'" The Indian
Ministry for Health and Family Welfare had overall responsibility for management of the Project and its funding. 45 However, a Special Grants Committee, together with the USAID mission in India, would screen applications
for subgrants related to the Project and inform the applicants whether they
had been awarded funding. 146
In February of 1985, the USAID mission in India reviewed PSS's application and then informed the Indian Ministry that USAID could not accept
it. 141 The Ministry undersecretary, K.L. Bhatia, told PSS that the Indian
Government rejected the application, on the ground that PSS "primarily performs or promotes abortion as a method of family planning and such activities" were not eligible for Project funding, because of the Standard Clause
restrictions.
Plaintiffs sued USAID, alleging that the Standard Clause: conflicted
with both the FAA and "important Congressional policies," was arbitrary
and capricious, and deprived them of Due Process of Law.' 48 Defendants
moved for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiffs were without standing
to bring their challenge because the injury complained of was not fairly
traceable to the USAID Standard Clause certification requirement, and it was
unlikely that a favorable ruling would redress their alleged injury.'4 9 The
court granted the motion.15 °
On appeal, plaintiffs were allowed to amend their complaint, to allege
that they were "otherwise qualified" to receive funds, in order to establish
"nonapplicant" standing.' 5 ' On remand, the district court held that: first,
DKT, a DNGO, had standing; second, as FNGO's, PSS and PSFP had standing to make a statutory challenge; third, the FAA did prohibit the President
from finding family planning NGO's ineligible for funding if they used
abortion; fourth, the Standard Clause was overbroad and infringed on
DNGOs' associational rights; and fifth, FNGO's did not have standing to
raise a First Amendment claim.'5 2 Defendants appealed.' 53
This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court rulings: all of
the statutory challenges to the Standard Clause were unmeritorious, and the
PSS and PSFP claims were dismissed for lack of standing.'54 The court re144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 238.

150. Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.

DKT Mem'I Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1988).
DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 297.
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versed the finding that the Standard Clause violated the right of DKT to associate with PSS and PSFP.'55 The court also found that DKT had not presented any ripe claims in which the clauses covering grants to unnamed
FNGO's unconstitutionally interfered with DKT's right to associate. 5 6 The
court then remanded the case with the instruction that it be dismissed.' 57 The
disposition of this case illustrates the degree of attenuation between the NGO
and USAID funding, which may still render the NGO ineligible for USAID
funding.
4. Population Institute v. McPherson
The sole action, in which the merits were actually reached, was Population Institute v. McPherson.'5 8 In 1985, after UNFPA was denied funding
because of involvement in China, the Population Institute, together with
other private organizations, filed suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking to enjoin McPherson, the USAID Administrator, from
withholding the $10 million that had been earmarked for UNFPA. 159 The
complaint alleged: that McPherson had acted under an unlawful designation
of authority; that McPherson had misinterpreted Kemp-Kasten, so his action
was erroneous; and that McPherson's action was arbitrary and capricious because there was no evidence of any UNFPA 16
involvement
in any program of
0
coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.
The same day that the complaint was filed, the district court issued a
temporary restraining order, which enjoined the government from disbursing
the $10 million. 161 Plaintiffs then sought a preliminary injunction and defendants moved to dismiss. 16 Defendants' motion was granted on the grounds
that: "the Population Institute had standing, that the controversy was not
moot, that the President's delegation of authority to the Administrator was
proper, but that the plaintiffs' challenges' 63to the Administrator's action presented nonjusticiable political questions.' 1
Notice of appeal was filed, but appellants also moved for an injunction
to prevent USAID from disbursing the funds at issue to anyone else. 164 Appellants' motion for an injunction was granted. 165 The court also considered
155. Id.
156. Id. In her dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that "the
handicap our government has placed on DKT's speech and association is repugnant to the
First Amendment." Id. at 307.
157. Id. at 299.
158. 797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 1065.
160. Id. at 1066.
161. Id.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 1067.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss2/6

16

Goldfarb: Abstinence Breeds Contempt: Why the U.S. Policy on Foreign Assist

2003]

ABSTINENCE BREEDS CONTEMPT

the propriety of McPherson's action and the "reviewability and correctness
of that determination as a matter of law."' 66 The court felt that the McPherson decision did not present a political question; rather, it was a "simple
1' 67
question of statutory construction that a court was competent to examine.'
The court found that McPherson had impermissibly relied solely on
Representative Kemp's interpretation of the Kemp-Kasten Amendment. 16 In
doing so, McPherson had delegated his "responsibility to interpret the will of
Congress to a single member of Congress."' 169 Since the "opportunity to
reach a reasoned interpretation of the statute belongs to the President and his
delegates," the court held that appellant was likely to succeed in demonstrating that McPherson committed legal error in assuming that he was compelled by law to apply the statutory interpretation provided by the author of
the statutory language. 70 However, the court also noted that, while not before the court, the issue of whether or not coerced abortion occurred
in China
71
was probably a political question, and therefore, non-justiciable.'
Before the appeal could be considered on the merits, McPherson issued
a statement, indicating that he would affirm his decision to deny the UNFA
funds, but had examined the statue in greater detail since the injunction had
been granted.7 2 According to the court, this statement adequately addressed
the concerns, which had prompted the granting of the injunction.17 In response to McPherson's statement, the court vacated the injunction.'7 4 The
court then rejected the government's claims that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question. 175 However, McPherson's decision to deny the
UNFPA funds was ultimately affirmed because, based on the additional evidence that McPherson indicated that he had176considered in his statement,
there was some rational basis for his decision.
5. Smith v. Atwood
In 1994, after President Clinton had repealed the Mexico City Policy
and the Standard Clause restrictions in USAID grants, U.S. Congressman
Christopher Smith, and several Chinese nationals, brought suit against Brian
Atwood, the new USAID Administrator. 177 These plaintiffs sought to enjoin

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1994).
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the disbursement of any U.S. funds to UNFPA, alleging that Atwood had illegally failed to determine that UNFPA was barred from receiving funding
from the U.S. 78 Defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of standing, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 79 The
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
Chinese nationals lacked standing to maintain the action, and that the action
was moot with respect to Congressman Smith. 8 '
The district court found that the Congressman's action was moot because a letter submitted to the court by defense counsel, stated that: "the restrictions in the ambiguous language of Kemp-Kasten are not triggered by
activities which are unintentional or remote, or which only indirectly or
marginally relate to a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization."' 81 Because the court was satisfied that the standard applied by Atwood, in deciding whether to disburse funds to UNFPA, was within
the con18 2
templation of the Appropriations Act, Atwood's claim was moot.
6. Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush
In the latest challenge to U.S. policy on foreign assistance for family
planning, the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP) sued George
W. Bush, in his capacity as President of the United States; Colin Powell, in
his capacity as Secretary of State; and Andrew Natsios, in his capacity as
USAID Administrator.' 83 CRLP, a DNGO that advocates for reproductive
rights, alleged that the Mexico City Policy violated CRLP attorneys' First
Amendment rights of speech and association, Due Process and Equal Protec84
tion provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and Customary International law.'
The district court dismissed the action, finding that CRLP, and its attorney
advocates, lacked Article III standing because the185restriction in the implementing Standard Clause applied only to FNGO's.
On appeal, after conducting a de novo review, the court again dismissed
the action.' 86 The court dismissed the Due Process claim for lack of prudential standing because CRLP was not within the zone of interests protected by
the Due Process clause.' 87 The court dismissed the Equal Protection claim as
meritless because, while CRLP had standing, a judicially created exception

178. Id. at 912.
179. Id.
180. Id.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
Cir. Mar.
186.
187.

Id. at915.
Id.
Ctr.for Reproductive Law and Policy, 2001 WL 868007, at *2.
Id.
Cir.for Reproductive Law and Policy, No 01-6168, 2002 WL 31045183, at *1 (2d
13, 2002).
Id.
Id.
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called "competitive advocate standing" caused the court to conclude that the
classification challenged by CRLP did not amount to an Equal Protection
violation.'8 8 The First Amendment challenge was then dismissed on the merits because of another judicially created exception, which allowed the court
to ignore a novel theory of standing because they determined that the identical legal issue had been determined twelve years earlier in Planned Parenthood.18 9
IV. POLICY DECISIONS WITH A PRO-LIFE AGENDA UNDERMINE BROADER
STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH LEAVES THE DECISIONS
VULNERABLE TO CHALLENGES UNDER NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A. The Legal Rationalefor the Recent UNFPA Decision is Problematic
The evolution of United States involvement in international family
planning programs, rooted in global population concerns, has yielded an international political forum for the domestic abortion debate.' 90 Private interest groups have been able to impact foreign policy decisions to a degree that
would be unconstitutional in domestic matters.' 9' The recent decisions that
have resulted from such influence actually undermine broader strategic goals
of the United States.' 92 Furthermore, if the decisions do serve a legitimate
foreign policy purpose, the legal rationale for not contributing to the UNFPA
would also prevent U.S. contribution to other international efforts, such as
the World Health Organization (WHO) and USAID itself because of their
similarly attenuated funding of abortion related activities. 93
There is increasing concern in the international community over the current Bush Administration's aggressive exercises in unilateralism. 19 4 The
United States could make concessions and reconsiderations on the international family planning issue that could help to dispel this concern. The resulting long-term strategic benefit that would result from renewed trust in the
United States and its international reputation is far more appropriate and
would outweigh any short-term domestic political backlash.

188. Id.

189. Id.
190. Feinstein Release, supra note 31; Global Gag Rule, supra note 31.
191. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31.
192. These goals are spelled out in 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2002). ICPD Statement, supra note
74.
193. July 22 Press Briefing, supranote 81.
194. Dao, supra note 72.
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B. Proposals
1. National
While the courts, on the issue of foreign assistance for family planning,
have been unwilling to wade too deep into the constitutional aspects of this
question in the past, reconsideration is now due. Some of the nuances of the
recent reimposition of restrictions, in light of developments in International
Law and the general tone of the global community, demand a fresh look at
old issues.
In their analysis of the most recent determination that Kemp-Kasten
precluded the release of UNFPA funds, the government cited Population Institute and Smith, as support for the decision.195 In the analysis, the language
excerpted from Population Institute is misleading. The analysis cites Population Institute for the proposition that "special deference should be accorded
the executive in those activities that impinge on foreign affairs," which
"strongly sugges[ts] that the executive branch's factual determinations re' Yet, in the
garding China's programs are not reviewable by the judiciary."196
actual opinion, the court goes on to explain that the case did not present a
non-justiciable political question, and that there could be a review of the
Administrator's decision.197 As applied to the recent UNFPA decision, and

contrary to the government's interpretation of Population Institute, the factual determinations regarding programs in China are reviewable by the judi198
ciary.
The language in the analysis, excerpted from Smith, is equally misleading. The government contends that in Smith, "the congressman had challenged a determination by the [US]AID Administrator that 'only clear evidence of knowing and intentional direct funding or support by UNFPA'
would trigger Kemp-Kasten. The court stated, '[i]t is quite clear that such a
standard is in no way contemplated by the Kemp[-]Kasten Amendment."' 1 99
In the actual opinion, the court applied a criminal intent standard, which was
not contemplated by Kemp-Kasten. 200 The court went on to cite language
contained in letter from counsel for the USAID Administrator, which stated
that, "the restrictions in the ambiguous language of Kemp-Kasten are not
triggered by activities which are unintentional or remote, or which only indi-

195. Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
196. Id. (citing PopulationInst., 797 F.2d at 1070).
197. PopulationInst., 797 F.2d at 1070.
198. The re-delegation of authority in 1995, from the USAID Administrator to the Secretary of State should not affect the plausibility of this proposal. See Analysis of Determination,
supra note 96.
199. Id. (citing Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911, 915 (D.D.C. 1994)).
200. Smith, 845 F. Supp. at 915.
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rectly or marginally relate to a program of coercive abortion or involuntary
sterilization. 2 0'
The recent UNFPA decision was based on the finding that UNFPA programs in China provided computer equipment to the Chinese government. 0 2
Presumably, this freed up money within the Chinese government to enforce
the one-child policy through means of coercive abortion and involuntarily
sterilizations.2 3 The fact finding team, sent by the U.S. to China to investigate allegations about the UNFPA, however, "found no evidence that
UNFPA ha[d] 'knowingly supported or participated in the management of a
program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization in [China]. '24 In
the absence of knowing participation or support, and with only an indirect
relation to allegedly prohibited programs, Kemp-Kasten should not have
been triggered by China's UNFPA programs.
While it seems clear that the rationale set forth for the denial of U.S.
funds for UNFPA was not legally sound, the reluctance of U.S. courts to involve themselves in Foreign Affairs matters will probably prevent many of
these issues from ever being addressed. Rather than a direct constitutional or
statutory challenge to an Executive Policy decision, both of which have
proved largely unsuccessful, plaintiffs may have a better chance at success if
the challenge is more contractually based.20 5
Since many of the USAID funding agreements last for several years,
and may overlap with a change in Administration, it may be possible for
some organizations to recover the funding unofficially, as a contractual remedy. This may be possible for programs and organizations that hire educators
and purchase family planning commodities over an extended period of time,
but with the reimposition of the Mexico City Policy and Standard Clause
provisions, or withdrawal of UNFPA funding, they are no longer able to fulfill contractual obligations with their employees or suppliers. It may be that
family planning commodity manufacturers would have a cause of action
against the government if FNGO's make up a substantial part of their market, but they are prevented from purchasing supplies because of U.S. funding
restrictions.
2. International
There are several International Agreements that may be violated by a
U.S. refusal to fund the UNFPA.2 °6 Most directly on point is the ICPD Pro201. Id.
202. Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. For an interesting proposal along similar lines see generally Rita Y. B. Carlson,
What if the United Nations Sued the United States?: A Hypothetical Case Analyzing the UN
Charteras a Government Contract,30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 525 (2001).
206. See Women's Reproductive Rights, available at http://www.crlp.org/pub-fac
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gramme of Action.20 7 In light of U.S. support of the Conference, it is no
longer appropriate for the U.S. to advocate for the Marxist-Leninist approach
set forth in the Mexico City Policy, which characterizes population growth
as a neutral phenomenon.20 8 The Programme of Action clearly recognizes
the relationship between population growth and underdevelopment. 9 The
goals set forth therein: to provide universal access to health and primary
education; reduce maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS; and advance gender
equality, seek to remedy the adverse effects of this relationship. l The Programme of Action also articulated "three essential principles of reproductive
rights": the right to freely decide the number and spacing of children; the
rights to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health; and
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of coercion, discrimination, or violence." 1 The U.S. claims continued support of those
2 12
goals.
Since the agreement is not self-executing, it does not, on its own, create
any enforceable rights at the domestic level.2 13 However, at the international
level, it seems hypocritical that the United States played a pivotal role in the
drafting of the goals and agreements, only to then discredit the International
agency that has undertaken a course towards their achievement.
President Bush claims to be "committed to helping the U.N. to advance
human rights, healthcare, security, and education throughout the world," and
has even gone so far as to proclaim October 24, 2002 United Nations Day.21 4
The U.S. praises the recent creation of a U.N. program on HIV/AIDS. 1 5

rights.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Women's Reproductive Rights].
207.

PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND

DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 95.XIII.18 (1995), available at http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/reports.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Programme of Action].

208. Mexico City Statement, supra note 59.
209. Programme ofAction, supra note 207.
210. ICPD Statement, supra note 74.
211.

United Nations, Report of the International Conference on Population and Devel-

opment, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994); Bharati Sadasivam, The Rights Framework in Reproductive Health Advocacy--A Reappraisal, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 322
(1997).
212. Press Release, U.S. State Department, U.S. International Population Policy (Nov. 7,
2002), available at http:/Iwww.state.govlr/palprs/ps/2002/14985pf.html(last visited Nov. 28,
2002).
213. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, United Nations Resolution as Judicially Enforceable in United States Domestic Courts, 42 A.L.R. FED. 577 (1979).
214. Proclamation by President George W. Bush, United Nations Day, 2002, Washington D.C. (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http:lwww.state.gov/p/iolrls/rm/2002/14638pf.htn-l
(last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
215. United Nations Fact Sheet, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Washington D.C. (Aug. 20, 2002), available at http:lwww.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/2002/12955pf.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
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This program brings together the resources of several other U.N. programs,
including UNFPA.21 6

The Bush Administration's insistence on unilateralism undercuts U.S.
sincerity and credibility in the eyes of the international community. 217 The
perceived insincerity is then a threat to national security. Countries that depend on UNFPA services and other U.S. funding resources could be allies in
fighting terror or mutually beneficial trade agreements. Instead, recent deci218
sions have caused skepticism and distrust of the American agenda.
If the problem is with allegedly coercive practices employed in China,
there are ways in which the leverage of U.S. funding could be wielded less
derisively. The U.S. should continue to support multilateral programs, and
inundate the successful ones, such as UNFPA, with funding. The United
States is an active member of the UNFPA Executive Board.219 If the daily
involvement of the UNFPA in China was troublesome, the U.S. delegation
could have called for a revision of program certification requirements, or
other such in-house accountability provisions. 220 The fact that the U.S. opted
to act unilaterally, choosing instead to call into question the credibility of the
UNFPA, seems inappropriate, and indicative of an ulterior agenda.
The U.S. is the only country to ever deny funding to the UNFPA for
non-financial reasons.2 21 In light of the ICPD Programme of Action, the In-

ternational Law concept of an obligation ergo omnes may, in theory, provide
a possible challenge to the funding decision.222 When the U.S. agreed to pursue the goals in the Programme of Action, it may have undertaken an obligation owed to all of the other governments who participated at the ICPD not
to withdraw funding for non-financial reasons, because doing so would undermine the principal goals which all parties agreed to pursue. If such an obligation exists, then any other party to the agreement may take action against
the United States, in order to enforce the obligation.22 3 In practice, there are
two significant challenges to this proposal. First, the Programme of Action is
not itself a binding treaty. 224 Rather, the goals set forth are meant to clarify
the policy and commitment of the international community. 225 This challenge may be overcome if the obligation not to deny funding for non-

216. Id.
217. Dao, supra note 72.

218. See id.
219. ICPD Statement, supra note 74.
220. See id.
221. UN Newsletter (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.un.org.pk/unic/newslet-

ters/NEWSLETTER020723.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
222. See The Barcelona Traction Case, (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); The

South West Africa Cases, (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
223. Id.
224. Sadasivam, supranote 211, at 322.
225. See id.
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22 6
financial reasons can be framed as a customary norm of international law.

The Programme of Action set forth goals to strengthen and implement other

international agreements. 227 The concept of pacta sunt servanda requires that
once a State is a party to an agreement, such a state may not act contrary to
the object and purpose of that agreement. 22 8 The United States is a party to
several of the agreements that the ICPD is meant to strengthen. 229 Since the

denial of funding for non-financial reasons is contrary to the object and purpose of the Programme of Action, it follows that the denial of funding for
non-financial reasons is also contrary to the object and purpose of the

agreements that the Programme of Action is meant to implement.
Second, even if such an obligation was recognized, one of the fundamental weaknesses of the United Nations is the lack of any effective centralized enforcement mechanisms. 23" This does not mean, however, that the ob-

ligation ceases to exist. The legitimacy of International Law does not depend
on strict adherence to the processes of traditional and familiar institutional

forms. 23 Rather, the international community may deem the United States'
denial of UNFPA funding for non-financial reasons, moralistic and politically suspicious. This may then result in heightened resistance to cooperation
with the United States on other issues that the Bush Administration has

deemed more strategically important.2 32
V. CONCLUSION

While a measure of Presidential discretion in the realm of Foreign Affairs is necessary, it should not be available as an insulated field where political supporters may go to get their campaign favors repaid. This is especially true with regards to a sensitive topic like abortion, where the domestic

226. Id. at 334. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102

(1987).
227. See Women's Reproductive Rights, supra note 212.
228. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969,
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
620 (5th ed. 1998).
229. The preamble of ICPD reaffirms Human Rights in these agreements. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Together, these agreements form the International Bill of
Rights.
230. Sadasivam, supra note 211, at 334.
231. Id. at 333.
232. As this Comment was going to publication, the United States embarked upon the
early stages of the disarmament of Iraq. As events have unfolded in the international community, these proposals have rung all too true. The author urges readers to bear this in mind over
the coming months, as questions about international law become increasingly common and
the answers take on an unprecedented relevance.
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debate is hotly contested and largely religious. The U.S. is trying to rally
support from the U.N. and build trust between nations with vastly diverse
cultures and religions. Now is not the time to insist on the infusion of a conservative ideological agenda into international agreements. This is not the
meaning of democracy in America. The mere attachment of a foreign policy
label should not permit circumvention of domestic constitutional restrictions
under these circumstances.
When made pursuant to the FAA, foreign assistance for family planning
is about development assistance, not abortion. If the United States claims to
support international cooperation for development and values the participation of NGO's, then the recent decision to withdraw UNFPA funding is illogical and runs contrary to government policy. The decision's hypocritical
legal rationale breeds international contempt for the American political
agenda, and sets the stage for challenges to U.S. foreign policy under National and International Law.
To focus so singularly on the abortion issue in international affairs is
short sighted. As the need for international alliances becomes increasingly
apparent, the issue of foreign assistance for family planning should not be
overlooked. The legal underpinnings of these funding decisions and their
treatment in U.S. foreign policy have important implications as reflections of
domestic law and politics, and as potential dealmakers or breakers in the international community.
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